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Incoming: Regulating Drones in Oklahoma 
I. Introduction 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, or drones) are an exciting new 
technology with a wide range of applications. UAVs are already playing 
valuable roles in law enforcement, search-and-rescue missions, and disaster 
relief, as well as in certain commercial applications, such as land and 
pipeline surveillance.1 They are also exciting tools for the media and for 
professional and amateur photographers alike.2 Currently, state legislatures 
across the United States are assessing if and how UAVs should be regulated 
within their states, taking into account not only these potential benefits but 
also privacy concerns of individuals.3 Thus far, thirty-nine states have 
enacted statutes addressing UAVs.4 As Oklahoma develops its own 
statutory response to UAVs, it should not only take into consideration 
potential shortfalls of applicable tort and criminal laws already in place, but 
also strive to strike a fair and reasonable balance between, on one hand, 
Oklahomans’ expectations of privacy and, on the other, the sundry potential 
benefits of UAV technology for some of Oklahoma’s primary industries—
namely, oil and gas and agriculture.  
This Comment examines the inability of existing theories of liability to 
adequately address the privacy concerns posed by UAVs. It also examines 
UAV-related state legislation attempting to fill those gaps. Part II quickly 
outlines the role of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in UAV 
regulation, as well as the constitutional implications of UAV use under the 
First and Fourth Amendments. Part III analyzes the potential commercial 
and environmental applications of UAVs in Oklahoma, focusing on 
Oklahoma’s primary industries. Part IV examines existing Oklahoma 
statutes and common law doctrines that may be used to impose liability for 
misuse of UAVs, including trespass, invasion of privacy, and nuisance. Part 
V outlines UAV statutes enacted by other states and analyzes UAV bills 
previously proposed or recently enacted by the Oklahoma legislature. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(June 8, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-
law-landscape.aspx [hereinafter Current Landscape]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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Finally, Part VI offers suggestions for Oklahoma’s statutory response to 
UAVs based on the best practices of other states.  
II. Federal Regulations and Constitutional Implications of UAVs 
A. Federal Regulation  
The FAA, which bears the responsibility of ensuring safety and 
efficiency within the American aerospace system,5 has been charged with 
the task of providing a regulatory framework for the integration of UAVs 
into the national airspace.6 While this responsibility, as mandated in the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA), is unquestionably 
extensive in scope, its focus is safety regulations.7 The integration of 
drones, however, raises serious questions outside the mere realm of safety. 
One key question is whether the use of drones by law enforcement may 
constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Further, 
operation of UAVs by hobbyists and commercial users raises questions of 
the manner and extent to which individual privacy rights are to be protected 
against UAVs with image-capturing capabilities.  
Unfortunately, uncertainty exists as to which governmental entity should 
be answering these questions.8 While some believe the FAA has the power 
to create and impose UAV privacy regulations, nothing in the FMRA 
expressly delegates this particular authority.9 It is possible that Congress 
will, in the future, expressly delegate authority to the FAA to create 
substantive UAV privacy protections, but there is concern that the FAA is 
ill-equipped to address issues so far outside its wheelhouse.10 Indeed, the 
FAA has actively steered away from questions of privacy. On August 29, 
2016, the FAA’s final rule on the operation and certification of UAVs went 
into effect. The rule covers requirements for remote pilots and visual 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Mission, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/mission (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2017) (stating that the mission of the FAA “is to provide the safest, most efficient 
aerospace system in the world”).  
 6. FAA Modernization and Reform Act (P.L. 112-095) Reports and Plans, FED. 
AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/plans_reports/modernization/ (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2017) (stating that the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (FMRA) will “seek[] to 
improve aviation safety and capacity of the national airspace system, [and] provide a 
framework for integrating new technology safely into our airspace”).  
 7. Melissa Barbee, Uncharted Territory: The FAA and the Regulation of Privacy Via 
Rulemaking for Domestic Drones, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 480 (2014). 
 8. Id. at 479. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 480. 
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observers and restrictions on UAV weight, altitude, and speed, but issues of 
privacy are notably absent.11 Alternatively, Congress may forego delegating 
the responsibility to the FAA and formulate federal UAV privacy policy 
legislation itself. Congress has, in fact, already proposed bills directed at 
UAV use. As of 2016, however, none had moved passed committee.12 
Further, none contemplate privacy protections against nongovernment 
operators, but focus solely on use by law enforcement.13  
In the absence of federal UAV laws, states have begun enacting their 
own.14 While some of these statutes may eventually be preempted should 
Congress choose to act,15 states are currently able to implement whatever 
UAV privacy regulations they deem appropriate for their state. These 
statutes vary in method and scope,16 illustrating the heterogeneity of states’ 
needs and concerns regarding UAVs. Further complicating this process, 
however, are unanswered questions at the constitutional level. To what 
extent do hobbyists have a right under the First Amendment to record and 
publish material captured by their UAVs? Are police precluded under the 
Fourth Amendment from using UAVs without first obtaining a warrant? In 
drafting UAV legislation, states must anticipate the answers as best they 
can.  
B. UAVs and the First Amendment  
In September 2015, a drone flown by an animal rights group was shot 
down in Oklahoma over an annual pigeon-shooting fundraiser for Senator 
Jim Inhofe, co-founder, ironically, of the Senate’s drone caucus.17 Though a 
dramatic example, this occurrence illustrates the type of clash that can 
result between privacy and First Amendment rights from the use of UAVs. 
While UAVs unquestionably implicate privacy concerns, it is important to 
acknowledge the other side of the coin. The freedom of speech and freedom 
of press guaranteed by the First Amendment may be implicated when 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 107.3 (2016). 
 12. Barbee, supra note 7, at 478-79; see infra Part V. 
 13. Barbee, supra note 7, at 478-79. 
 14. See infra Part V.  
 15. Barbee, supra note 7, at 481. 
 16. See Current Landscape, supra note 1, for the variation in state legislation of UAVs.  
 17. Elise Viebeck, Enemy Drone Shot Down over Inhofe Fundraiser, WASH. POST: 
POWER POST (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/ 
09/14/enemy-drone-shot-down-over-inhofe-fundraiser/. 
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limitations are imposed on the use of UAVs to record.18 The First 
Amendment, however, does not necessarily provide for an unmitigated 
right to record.19  
While law delineating the limits of the right to record remains very 
underdeveloped, the proliferation of drones will likely produce cases 
regarding the issue. While it is not generally illegal to photograph or 
videotape people in public, this is not necessarily a right afforded by the 
First Amendment.20 Further, if the First Amendment only protects some 
types of aerial videography and not others, along what lines is this 
distinction to be drawn? Possibilities include photography versus non-
artistic photographs, journalists versus non-journalists, and public matters 
versus private matters, among others.21  
Prior to the FAA’s finalization of its UAV rule, the FAA prohibited the 
commercial use of UAVs, including journalistic use. Drone journalism 
programs and storm chasers alike received condemnation from the FAA for 
their unauthorized journalistic uses of UAVs.22 The FAA’s final rule, 
however, opened up UAV use to commercial users, including journalists.23 
First Amendment problems may still exist, however, in the restrictions 
imposed by states as they attempt to protect against invasions of privacy. 
Until the law in this area further develops, it will be difficult to determine 
how the balance should be struck between these two core interests.  
C. UAVs and the Fourth Amendment 
One of the most compelling issues regarding UAV technology is how it 
should be integrated into our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Drone use 
promises tremendous benefits to law enforcement, including keeping 
officers out of harm’s way and facilitating evidence collection. But current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not necessarily provide an easy 
analysis for whether or when the use of drone technology by law 
enforcement constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Under Katz v. United 
States, law enforcement officials must obtain a warrant in situations where 
an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and where “society is 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Marc Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Henderson & Joseph Thai, 
Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 
80-107 (2015). 
 19. Id. at 88-91. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 82-83. 
 23. Id. at 83. 
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prepared to recognize [that expectation] as ‘reasonable.’”24 Under the 
Supreme Court cases California v. Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States, and Florida v. Riley, the Fourth Amendment typically does not 
preclude evidence obtained through warrantless aerial surveillance of open 
fields or curtilage from public airspace.  
Under the general rule that visual observation does not constitute a 
Fourth Amendment search, the Court has consistently upheld the 
constitutionality of warrantless aerial surveillance. In Ciraolo, law 
enforcement officials received a warrant based on their observation of 
marijuana from a plane as they flew over the property at 1000 feet.25 The 
Court held that the “respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected 
from [aerial observation was] unreasonable and is not an expectation that 
society is prepared to honor.”26 Three years later, the Court decided Riley, 
which also involved aerial observation of marijuana on private property, but 
here the police flew only 400 feet above the ground.27 The Court held that 
helicopters flying at 400 feet are not sufficiently rare to make their presence 
unreasonable under Katz.28 Finally, in Dow Chemical, the Court held that 
photographs obtained through an aerial mapping camera did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, noting that even though the camera had zooming 
capabilities and captured “a great deal more than the human eye could ever 
see,” the photographs were not so revealing of intimate details as to raise 
constitutional concerns.29 
This trilogy of cases illustrates the Court’s past willingness to interpret 
aerial surveillance—including aerial photographic surveillance—as 
reasonable in the Fourth Amendment context. The trend is clear, as the 
Court has thus far pushed the boundary of reasonableness further and 
further with each new advancement in aerial surveillance. Under current 
precedent, police may fly above private property and zoom in with a 
camera without first obtaining a warrant. But is unmitigated, warrantless 
police use of drones beyond that which society is prepared to accept as 
                                                                                                                 
 24. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule 
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  
 25. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).  
 26. Id. at 214. 
 27. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989). 
 28. Id. at 451-52. 
 29. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235, 249-50 (1986). 
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reasonable? The preemptive legislative response of many states to drone 
technology suggests that, perhaps, it is.30  
Yet, for the Supreme Court to hold that drone surveillance requires a 
warrant, it would first have to overcome a few hurdles of its own creation. 
First, photographs or video obtained from camera-bearing UAVs would not 
necessarily be more intrusive than photographs or video obtained from 
helicopters, so the Court would have to find a creative way to distinguish 
drones from the aerial surveillance in Dow Chemical. Additionally, the 
Court has attempted to safeguard privacy against police use of advancing 
technology by basing the reasonability analysis, in part, on whether the 
technology is in general public use.31 In Kyllo v. United States, police used 
a thermal imaging device to observe inside a home.32 Distinguishing this 
technology from the cameras in Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, the Court held 
that use of the thermal imaging device failed the Katz reasonability test 
largely because such a device was not in general public use.33 Drones, 
however, pass this test. They are already in general public use, owned and 
operated by everyday hobbyists, and soon to be employed pervasively by 
commercial users.  
Kyllo was a self-proclaimed effort by the Court to “take the long view” 
of the Fourth Amendment so that it may serve as precedent that sufficiently 
addresses “yet-to-be-developed technology.”34 In doing so, the Court 
appeared to retract a bit from Dow Chemical in a manner that bears 
significant relevance to advancing aerial surveillance technologies. The 
Court noted:  
The present case involves officers on a public street engaged in 
more than naked-eye surveillance of a home. We have 
previously reserved judgment as to how much technological 
enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, 
if any, is too much. While we upheld enhanced aerial 
photography of an industrial complex in Dow Chemical, we 
noted that we found “it important that this is not an area 
immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy 
expectations are most heightened.”35 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See infra Part V.  
 31. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 40 (2001). 
 32. Id. at 29. 
 33. Id. at 33-34. 
 34. Id. at 40, 42.  
 35. Id. at 33 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986)). 
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Extrapolating from the aerial surveillance trilogy and Kyllo, the 
constitutionality of warrantless UAV surveillance could be based on 
whether or not the surveillance is of a private home or whether the drone 
possesses enhanced zooming capabilities or additional surveillance 
technologies that are not in general public use.  
III: Oklahoma Commercial Interests 
Prior to the FAA’s finalization of its UAV rule, commercial use of 
UAVs was forbidden, and violations were subject to hefty fines.36 
However, during this time the FAA granted authorization in the form of 
section 333 exemptions to more than 5500 entities.37 These exemptions 
authorized commercial use on a case-by-case basis and restricted that use to 
very specific types of operations.38 Some of these operations are 
particularly applicable to Oklahoma. It is clear from the commercial use of 
UAVs pursuant to section 333 exemptions that UAVs have many beneficial 
applications to Oklahoma industries, which may now be widely 
implemented.  
A. Oil and Gas  
The FAA provided exemptions for commercial operations related to oil 
and gas, Oklahoma’s largest industry. In all, the FAA gave authorization for 
such use to more than eighty-five entities.39 These oil and gas operations 
included pipeline and oil-field inspection, aerial data acquisitions, 
photogrammetry, precision aerial surveys, exploration, platform inspections 
on land and over water, oil spill responses, aerial imaging for safety and 
monitoring of controlled access oil and gas facilities, and oil and gas 
industry infrastructure inspection and demonstration flights.40  
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_ 
basics/section_333/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2017); see also Alan Levin, FAA Seeks Largest 
Fine Yet on Drones in Near-Miss Crackdown, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 6, 2015, 3:57 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-06/faa-urges-largest-fine-yet-on-drones-
in-crackdown-on-near-misses (reporting that the FAA fined SkyPan International Inc. for 
$1.9 million for making sixty-five drone flights in airspace above New York). 
 37. Section 333, supra note 36. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 Exemptions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/333_authorizations/ (filter exceptions 
for “Oil”) (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
 40. Id. 
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Drones promise to lower costs and increase efficiency in areas such as 
data collection and pipeline inspection.41 They could also help mitigate 
environmental risks through the quick detection and monitoring of methane 
gas leaks.42 The cumulative economic benefit to Oklahoma promises to be 
significant.  
B. Agriculture  
UAVs also offer significant potential in Oklahoma’s agricultural 
industry. The Association for Unmanned Vehicles Systems International, 
which is the trade group that represents both users and producers of UAVs, 
projects that the commercial market for UAVs will be dominated at a 
staggering eighty percent by agricultural uses.43 The potential benefits are 
clear. UAVs can facilitate aerial data collection of crop progression, which 
allows for better crop planting and rotation strategies.44 They can provide 
images that show the health of the fields and identify problems affecting 
crop yield.45 They effectively eliminate the need for on-foot and airplane 
visual inspection, which can be time consuming, unreliable, and costly.46 
UAVs tailored for agricultural use might also be retrofitted with thermal 
sensors, which could identify areas of land where plants are showing early 
signs of stress.47  
UAVs will also facilitate precision agriculture, which is the process of 
tailoring the amount of fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides, and other products 
used in specific areas in the field based on the needs of that specific area, 
rather than applying the same amount over a large area.48 This not only 
saves farmers money by preventing unnecessary overuse but also reduces 
the amount of chemical runoff.49  
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Dyan Gibbens, UAS Manufacturers Are Focusing on Commercial Applications 
of Unmanned Aircraft in the Petroleum Industry, OIL & GAS FIN. J. (Dec. 16, 2014), http:// 
www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-11/issue-12/features/drones-in-oil-and-gas.html. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Christopher Doering, Growing Use of Drones Poised to Transform Agriculture, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/03/23/ 
drones-agriculture-growth/6665561/. 
 44. Clay Dillow, Why 2015 Is the Year Agriculture Drones Take Off, FORTUNE (May 
18, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/05/18/drone-agriculture/. 
 45. See Drones for Agricultural Crop Surveillance, PRECISION DRONE, https://web-beta. 
archive.org/web/20161006081024/http://www.precisiondrone.com/drones-for-agriculture.html 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Doering, supra note 43.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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The FAA has granted section 333 exemptions to more than 888 entities 
for commercial use in agriculture.50 Now that the FAA allows for broad 
commercial use of UAVs, the agricultural industry in Oklahoma will likely 
become a major UAV market. According to a 2016 state agriculture 
overview conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture, 
Oklahoma ranks fourth in the nation in wheat production and fifth in the 
nation in cattle and calves.51 Farmland covers three-fourths of the state; 
that’s roughly thirty-four million acres of land.52 With these numbers, the 
cumulative economic benefit of UAVs to this state industry will 
undoubtedly be very positive.  
C. Weather Forecasting 
Though perhaps not as evident as the oil and gas and agricultural 
applications, UAVs may also play an important role in Oklahoma weather 
forecasting. The University of Oklahoma, Oklahoma State University, and 
two other partnering universities have received a significant grant from the 
National Science Foundation for this purpose.53 The goal is to develop 
UAVs that improve understanding and monitoring capabilities of 
atmospheric conditions.54 Meteorologists currently build forecasting models 
based on radar and ground-based instruments, but UAVs could enhance 
atmospheric data collection and allow for better, more accurate models.55 In 
a state with unpredictable and sometimes violent weather, these 
improvements in meteorology have the potential to save lives.  
IV. Regulation of UAVs Under Current State Statutes and Common Law 
Doctrines 
While UAVs offer significant potential benefits to Oklahoma industries, 
they also raise legitimate privacy concerns. If private and commercial UAV 
users capture images of you or your home, what power, if any, do you have 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Authorizations, supra note 39.  
 51. 2016 State Agriculture Overview, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Quick_Stats/Ag_Overview/stateOverview.php?state=OKLAHOM
A (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
 52. Oklahoma Agriculture Statistics 2014, OKLA. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.oda.state. 
ok.us/stats/agstats2014.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
 53. University Researchers to Develop Weather-Forecasting Drone System, 
EMERGENCY MGMT. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/Research 
ers-Develop-Weather-Drones.html. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
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to stop them? What types of remedies might you have? How are such 
remedies to be effectively enforced when it is difficult to prove the UAV’s 
flight path and the identity of the owner?  
These questions lack satisfactory answers under the currently available 
theories of liability. When UAVs interfere with the privacy of Oklahomans, 
there are few common law doctrines or statutes that truly address the 
concerns. Theories of liability that may potentially be used to address 
privacy from UAVs include trespass, private nuisance, and invasion of 
privacy. As this section illustrates, however, these theories of liability are 
not perfectly suited to UAV technology and leave disconcerting gaps in 
protection.  
A. Trespass 
Trespass liability protects landowners against intentional, physical 
intrusions onto their land.56 As defined in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, trespass encompasses not only situations in which an individual 
personally enters the land but also situations in which a person causes an 
object to enter onto the property of another, regardless of whether damages 
were caused: 
The actor, without himself entering the land, may invade 
another’s interest in its exclusive possession by throwing, 
propelling, or placing a thing either on or beneath the surface of 
the land or in the air space above it. Thus, in the absence of the 
possessor’s consent or other privilege to do so, it is an actionable 
trespass to throw rubbish on another’s land, even though he 
himself uses it as a dump heap, or to fire projectiles or to fly an 
advertising kite or balloon through the air above it, even though 
no harm is done to the land or to the possessor’s enjoyment of 
it.57  
Further, the Restatement provides that intrusions may be on, beneath, or 
(as applicable to UAVs) above the surface of the land.58 Trespass by 
aircraft occurs when the intrusion is within the “immediate reaches of the 
airspace next to the land” and substantially interferes with the use and 
enjoyment of the land.59 While courts have made clear that the axiom 
“cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum”—he who owns the soil owns 
                                                                                                                 
 56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).  
 57. Id. § 158 cmt. i. 
 58. Id. § 159. 
 59. Id. 
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upward unto heaven—no longer represents the law, courts have also failed 
to neatly define or provide a categorical rule for the precise height at which 
a property owner’s ownership ends and public airspace begins. For 
purposes of trespass, ownership of airspace is restricted to that which is 
within the “immediate reaches” of the land.60 The Supreme Court further 
described this area as “at least as much of the space above the ground as 
[the landowner or lawful occupant] can occupy or use in connection with 
the land.”61  
Under Oklahoma law, a trespass is “an actual physical invasion of the 
property of another.”62 In the one case in which the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma mentioned aerial trespass, it reiterated the “substantial 
interference” standard articulated in the Restatement. In Henthorn v. 
Oklahoma City, the plaintiffs owned property near Will Rogers World 
Airport and alleged that aircraft were trespassing, as their altitudes were 
below 500 feet at the point at which they crossed plaintiffs’ property.63 The 
court held that the plaintiffs must show “substantial interference with the 
use and enjoyment of the property affected.”64  
Federal cases such as the Tenth Circuit’s Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith65 
narrow aerial trespass liability further so that it occurs only upon substantial 
interference with actual, rather than potential, use of the land.66 In Pueblo 
of Sandia, for instance, the appellant owned land immediately adjacent to a 
small airport. Airplanes generally crossed over the appellant’s property line 
at less than 150 feet.67 The appellant’s land was uninhabited for 3.4 miles 
past this boundary line.68 The court rejected the argument that trespass is 
interference with possession rather than use, and found that no trespass 
occurred because there was no substantial interference with the use of the 
land.69 The court noted that the appellees could fly at higher altitudes if the 
appellant chose to use the airspace near the property line.70  
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. 
 61. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). 
 62. Fairlawn Cemetery Ass’n v. First Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. of Okla. City, 1972 
OK 66, ¶ 14, 496 P.2d 1185, 1187. 
 63. 1969 OK 76, ¶ 2, 453 P.2d 1013, 1014. 
 64. Id. ¶ 15, 453 P.2d at 1016. 
 65. 497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974). 
 66. See id. at 1044; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 
1965).  
 67. Pueblo of Sandia, 497 F.2d at 1044. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 1046; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. k (“Subsequent 
Federal cases have limited the trespass liability to such cases, so that, even though there is a 
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Under this formulation of aerial trespass, it appears that tort claims of 
trespass by UAVs would be largely unsuccessful. There are few occasions 
in which a UAV passing overhead could be construed as substantial 
interference with the actual use of land. Even in cases in which a UAV flies 
low over the property for an extended period, it likely would not prevent the 
property owner from using the airspace if the owner so chose. 
Oklahoma criminal-trespass statutes may appear at first to offer a more 
useful option, yet these too fall short. Title 21, section 1835 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes states:  
Whoever shall willfully or maliciously enter the garden, yard, 
pasture or field of another after being expressly forbidden to do 
so or without permission by the owner or lawful occupant 
thereof when such property is posted71 shall be deemed guilty of 
trespass and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum 
not to exceed Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00); provided, 
that this provision shall not apply to registered land surveyors 
and registered professional engineers for the purpose of land 
surveying in the performance of their professional services.72 
Oklahoma then separately criminalizes trespass upon private land 
devoted to farming, ranching, or forestry,73 but with some exceptions: 
among the groups excepted are government officials and parties engaging 
in oil and gas activities with surface-owner or mineral-owner permission.74 
Title 21, section 1835.2 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that “whoever 
willfully enters private land of another that is primarily devoted to farming, 
ranching, or forestry purposes without permission by the surface owner, 
surface lessee, hunting lessee, or lawful occupant thereof shall be deemed 
guilty of trespass.”75 
                                                                                                                 
flight below the prescribed minimum altitude, there is no trespass unless there is such 
interference with actual, as distinguished from potential, use.”). 
 70. Pueblo of Sandia, 497 F.2d at 1044.  
 71. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1835(A) (2011) (“For purposes of this section, ‘posted’ means 
exhibiting signs to read as follows: ‘PROPERTY RESTRICTED’; ‘POSTED – KEEP 
OUT’; ‘KEEP OUT’; ‘NO TRESPASSING’; or similar signs which are displayed. Property 
that is fenced or not fenced must have such signs placed conspicuously and at all places 
where entry to the property is normally expected.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 1835.2(A). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
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In addition to title 21, section 1835.2, Oklahoma further protects private 
land devoted to farming, ranching, and forestry with the Oklahoma Private 
Lands and Public Recreation Act.76 This Act prohibits all recreational 
trespass on such lands, regardless of postings.77 For the purposes of this 
Act, recreational trespass means “remaining on land for a recreational use 
after being asked to leave by the owner, or the entry on land for a 
recreational use without the express or implied consent of the owner.”78 
Recreational use means “any activity undertaken for exercise, education, 
relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”79 Penalties include 
either a fine of $250 or imprisonment for up to ten days. Multiple 
convictions can lead to fines of $2500 or up to six months’ imprisonment.80  
It is questionable whether the wording of Oklahoma trespass statutes 
could be interpreted to encompass UAVs. The word “whoever” (used in 
both title 21, sections 1835 and 1835.2 of the Oklahoma Statutes) appears 
to contemplate trespass by humans, rather than by devices, onto private 
property. Similarly, the Oklahoma Private Lands and Public Recreation Act 
contemplates instances where “the person is on the land.”81 In some states 
the term “entry” in criminal trespass statutes is defined broadly enough to 
potentially encompass UAVs.82 For example, the Arizona criminal trespass 
statute defines “entry” as “the intrusion of any part of any instrument or any 
part of a person’s body inside external boundaries of a structure or unit of 
real property.”83 Here, UAVs would easily fall under the term “instrument.” 
Oklahoma trespass statutes, however, do not include definitions for “entry.” 
Thus, whether the term “entry” in Oklahoma’s trespass statutes 
encompasses intrusions by instruments or objects remains an open question 
for the court.  
Even if courts impose liability for UAV intrusions under the theory of 
trespass, this avenue of liability proves problematic. First, it would 
theoretically impose liability on the hapless hobbyist who accidentally and 
unknowingly skirted his or her UAV across a corner of someone else’s 
airspace. Given the ease of making such a mistake, this could commonly 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. §§ 1835.3 to 1835.10. 
 77. Id. §§ 1835.5 to 1835.6. 
 78. Id. § 1835.4. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. § 1835.7. 
 81. Id. § 1835.5. 
 82. John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and 
Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 499 (2013).  
 83. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1501 (West 2012); see also Villasenor, supra note 82. 
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occur. Second, trespass concepts fail to address the primary concern at 
issue. Presumably, private land owners’ chief concern over UAVs entering 
their personal airspace is not that they will interfere with the actual or 
potential use of their land or with other property rights, but rather that they 
will intrude upon privacy. Considering the zooming capabilities of UAV 
cameras, the relative location of the UAV just within or just outside of 
private airspace makes little difference with regard to privacy implications.  
It is unclear whether current Oklahoma trespass law encompasses 
protection against intrusions by UAVs. Even if it does, limitations imposed 
by trespass liability would serve only as half measures toward addressing 
UAV privacy intrusions.  
B. Private Nuisance  
Private nuisance also addresses interference with the use or enjoyment of 
land, but, unlike trespass, private nuisance does not require actual entry 
onto the land.84 Private nuisance generally requires intent and 
unreasonableness.85 Reasonableness is often determined by balancing the 
gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct.86 Considerations 
include the severity of the harm, whether the invasion was avoidable, the 
suitability of the locality, and the level of burden involved in minimizing 
the harm.87 Further, most private nuisance litigation involves recurrent or 
continuing invasion.88 Significantly, nuisance generally involves such 
conditions as vibrations, smoke, odors, noise, heat, and light.89  
Oklahoma law provides both a statutory and a common law claim for 
private nuisance, the former incorporating but not abrogating the latter.90 
The Oklahoma nuisance statute provides that nuisance may be an act that 
“[a]nnoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of 
others,” “[o]ffends decency,” or “[i]n any way renders other persons 
insecure in life, or in the use of property.”91 Oklahoma has also adopted the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts’ standard for common law private 
                                                                                                                 
 84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. §§ 829-831. 
 87. Id.; see also Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1977).  
 88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 825 cmt. d.  
 89. See City of Tecumseh v. Deister, 1925 OK 661, ¶ 9, 239 P. 582, 584 (stating that a 
nuisance could be anything that is “calculated to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of 
a man’s house, as smoke, noise, or bad odors, even when not injurious to health”).  
 90. Nichols v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line, 1996 OK 118, ¶ 8, 933 P.2d 272, 276.  
 91. 50 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (2011). 
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nuisance,92 which is “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the 
private use and enjoyment of land.”93  
As with trespass, Oklahoma has a right-to-farm statute covering nuisance 
liability, which applies a different standard for agricultural activity. Title 
50, section 1.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which contemplates nuisance 
liability for agricultural activities, states that “[a]gricultural activities 
conducted on farm or ranch land, if consistent with good agricultural 
practices and established prior to nearby nonagricultural activities, are 
presumed to be reasonable and do not constitute a nuisance unless the 
activity has a substantial adverse effect on the public health and safety.”94  
While the presence of UAVs on one’s private property arguably 
interferes with one’s enjoyment of the land, case law on private nuisance 
suggests that an action could not lie absent a showing that the UAV created 
excessive noise, light pollution, vibrations, air pollution, or similar 
condition. Several landowners have been successful in nuisance actions 
brought for low-flying aircraft, but these involved the presence of one or 
more of these factors.95 The mere fact of their presence was insufficient. A 
few courts have allowed nuisance claims for interference with peace of 
mind, such as when a funeral parlor is placed next door, yet the courts 
attempted to articulate some tangible interference in these cases as well.96 
While nuisance due to interference with peace of mind offers a possible 
argument for UAVs with photographic technologies, this argument pushes 
the doctrine beyond its current limits. Further, a nuisance action based on 
the noise or other tangible effects of UAVs would likely fail because such 
effects must be substantial in nature.97  
Some, however, may find private nuisance to be a particularly attractive 
theory of liability in the context of UAVs because it generally provides for 
the self-help remedy of abatement. Oklahoma’s nuisance statute, for 
instance, provides that “[a] person injured by a private nuisance may abate 
it by removing, or, if necessary, destroying the thing which constitutes the 
nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Nichols, ¶ 11, 933 P.2d at 277.  
 93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D. 
 94. 50 OKLA. STAT. § 1.1(B). 
 95. Brian Craig, Online Satellite and Aerial Images: Issues and Analysis, 83 N.D. L. 
REV. 547, 560 (2007).  
 96. See Brown v. Arbuckle, 198 P.2d 550, 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (“Medical 
testimony was received to the effect that the mental strain caused thereby would reasonably 
result in direct physical disturbances.”). 
 97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. d.  
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injury.”98 The United States has already seen several instances of property 
owners employing self-help remedies by shooting down UAVs that cross 
over their property lines. A successful claim of private nuisance could, in 
states that allow for abatement, preclude potential liability for destruction of 
property where such destruction is reasonable. Whether this remedial action 
exceeds the bounds of private nuisance theory remains an issue for the 
courts.  
C. Invasion of Privacy, Stalking, and Peeping Tom  
Invasion of privacy, in effect, “fill[s] in the gaps left by trespass [and] 
nuisance.”99 Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B provides that an 
invasion of privacy occurs if someone “intentionally intrudes, physically or 
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns,” so long as a reasonable person would find such an intrusion 
highly offensive.100 While this type of invasion of privacy does not require 
the element of publication,101 publication is almost always involved.102 Few 
cases address the act of taking a picture uncoupled from the subsequent act 
of publication.103  
In general, courts have not considered the taking of a person’s 
photograph without his or her consent an invasion of privacy.104 This is 
particularly true when the picture is taken in a public place. Courts refuse to 
find invasion of privacy when photographs are taken in public, even when 
the photographer continuously follows the subject for this purpose.105 
Courts are more likely to find invasion of privacy when the photograph is 
taken of the subject inside his or her home.106 Even so, monetary recovery 
generally requires a showing that the subject suffered emotional distress as 
a result.107  
Oklahoma recognizes a common law tort of invasion of privacy based on 
the Restatement’s standard.108 This includes the “intrusion upon seclusion” 
                                                                                                                 
 98. 50 OKLA. STAT. § 14. 
 99. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 392 (1960). 
 100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
 101. Id. § 652B cmt. a. 
 102. Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Taking Unauthorized Photographs as Invasion of 
Privacy, 86 A.L.R.3d 374 § 2 (1978). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Hassman, supra note 102. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 1978 OK 123, ¶ 17, 584 P.2d 1336, 1340. 
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form of invasion.109 Oklahoma has also enacted criminal statutes 
prohibiting certain behaviors that either fall within the invasion of privacy 
umbrella or relate heavily to it. For instance, Oklahoma has a criminal 
statute prohibiting the appropriation of a person’s image for advertisement 
purposes without the person’s consent.110 Oklahoma has also enacted a 
Peeping Tom statute, which makes loitering around residences for the 
purpose of watching its occupants a misdemeanor.111 It provides:  
Every person who uses photographic, electronic or video 
equipment in a clandestine manner for any illegal, illegitimate, 
prurient, lewd or lascivious purpose with the unlawful and 
willful intent to view, watch, gaze or look upon any person 
without the knowledge and consent of such person when the 
person viewed is in a place where there is a right to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, or who publishes or distributes any 
image obtained from such act, shall, upon conviction, be guilty 
of a felony.112 
This statute potentially encompasses UAV privacy infringements where 
a camera-mounted UAV is used to film a residence and its occupant. 
Further, liability under this statute differs from Oklahoma’s trespass statute 
because it does not turn on whether the equipment was inside or outside 
property lines. It does, however, require a particular motive that would not 
always be applicable.  
Originally, the Peeping Tom statute’s applicability was limited to 
instances where the victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy.113 In 
Durant v. State, the court noted that, in addition to residences, this includes 
locker rooms, dressing rooms, and restrooms.114 It does not, however, 
include images taken in a public place.115 In Durant, the appellant had 
hidden a camera in his backpack and attempted to take photographs of a 
female student’s undergarments while she was sitting in the lobby of an 
Oklahoma City community college.116 The court held that section 1171(b) 
of the Peeping Tom statute did not apply because she was in a public place 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. ¶ 13, 584 P.2d at 1339.  
 110. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 839.1 (2011). 
 111. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1171(A) (2011). 
 112. Id. § 1171(B). 
 113. Id. 
 114. 2008 OK CR 17, ¶ 6, 188 P.3d 192, 193. 
 115. Id. ¶ 9, 188 P.3d at 194.  
 116. Id. ¶ 3, 188 P.3d at 193. 
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and the statute refers to one’s reasonable expectation of privacy while in a 
particular location, not to expectations of privacy about a particular place 
on one’s body.117  
This decision appears to have led to the enactment of section 1171(c), 
approved only months after the Durant decision, which broadened Peeping 
Tom liability to include protection of private areas of the body “regardless 
of whether the person is in a public or private place.”118 A Durant 
concurrence appropriately highlights that when it comes to issues involving 
developing technology, legislative response is generally reactionary: “The 
legislative branch has simply not kept up with the fantasies of the deviant 
mind and the technology used to fulfill those abhorrent fantasies. Most 
criminal statutes are written as a reaction to some type of conduct or in an 
attempt to curb future conduct, deemed to be ‘criminal.’”119 
The Durant decision illustrates Oklahoma’s willingness to make an 
exception to the general rule that protection from such privacy invasions 
does not extend to public areas. Should Oklahoma wish to expand to some 
degree protections against the use of UAVs to surreptitiously record 
individuals for prurient purposes outside the home, extending the Peeping 
Tom statute may provide an appropriate avenue.  
Similarly, Oklahoma’s stalking statutes could serve as an appropriate 
avenue for liability for some forms of UAV privacy invasions. First, title 
21, section 1173 of the Oklahoma Statutes criminalizes the act of following 
or harassing another in a manner that causes a person, or would cause a 
reasonable person, to “feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, 
harassed, or molested.”120 Further, the harassment must be malicious and 
recurrent.121 The statute defines “harassment” as  
a pattern or course of conduct directed toward another individual 
that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing 
unconsented contact, that would cause a reasonable person to 
suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes emotional 
distress to the victim. . . . Harassment does not include 
constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves a 
legitimate purpose.122 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. ¶ 9, 188 P.3d at 194. 
 118. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1171(C) (2011). 
 119. Durant, ¶ 2, 188 P.3d at 195 (Lewis, J., specially concurring). 
 120. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1173(A)(2). 
 121. Id. § 1173(F). 
 122. Id. § 1173(F)(1). 
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The term “pattern or course of conduct”123 appears broad enough to 
encompass the use of technologies, but nothing explicitly suggests that a 
court would construe it as such.  
Second, the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act provides that a victim 
of stalking or harassment may seek a protection order.124 While the Act’s 
definition of “harassment” is limited to conduct by family or household 
members or individuals who are or were involved in dating relationships 
with the individual, its definition for “stalking” encompasses conduct by 
any adult.125 Further, the definition for stalking includes a non-
comprehensive list of examples of prohibited conduct that may constitute 
stalking. This includes following or approaching the individual in a public 
place or on private property, sending electronic communications, 
telephoning, and placing an object on the individual’s property. Courts 
could potentially interpret this broadly enough to encompass the act of 
following and photographing an individual with a UAV. Otherwise, the 
Oklahoma legislature could consider amending the statute to add the use of 
UAVs to the list of enumerated conduct.  
Of course, the Peeping Tom and stalking statutes are very limited and 
would be inapplicable to many potential privacy intrusions by UAVs. 
Trespass and nuisance, similarly, fall short in their ability to adequately 
address key UAV privacy concerns. Therefore, Oklahoma should consider 
either amending existing statutes or enacting UAV-specific statutes.  
V. UAV Bills and Statutes  
Members of the United States Congress have introduced a small number 
of bills aimed at restricting the use of UAVs for domestic surveillance.126 
The Preserving American Privacy Act of 2015 called for a restriction in the 
amount of personal identifying information law enforcement could obtain 
through use of UAVs and sought to impose a blanket warrant requirement 
on such data collection.127 It also banned the use of weapons on UAVs in 
national airspace.128 The Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted 
Surveillance Act of 2013 sought to prevent law enforcement from using 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id.  
 124. 22 id. § 60.2(A). 
 125. Id. § 60.1(2)-(3); see also Null v. Polin, 2014 OK CIV APP 12, ¶ 26, 319 P.3d 689, 
693. 
 126. Barbee, supra note 7, at 477.  
 127. Preserving American Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 1385, 114th Cong. § 3119c (2015). 
 128. Id. § 3119h. 
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UAVs to collect evidence in criminal cases.129 The Drone Aircraft Privacy 
and Transparency Act of 2015 sought to amend the FMRA to require a 
study on privacy risks created by the integration of UAVs.130 None of these 
bills passed. While their mere introduction suggests that Congress may 
enact UAV privacy policy legislation at some point in the future, no federal 
laws currently exist on the issue.  
In the absence of federal UAV statutes, states have begun crafting their 
own. In 2015, forty-five states considered a total of 168 bills related to 
UAVs.131 In 2016, thirty-eight states considered UAV bills.132 Eighteen 
states passed thirty-two pieces of UAV-related legislation in 2016 alone.133 
The short survey of these statutes below illustrates the diversity of state 
approaches to UAV use by law enforcement and the general public. 
A. State Statutes Regulating UAV Use by Law Enforcement  
Maine, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and Virginia have enacted statutes 
that limit the use of UAVs by law enforcement.134 Maine’s UAV statute 
prohibits law enforcement from operating UAVs without a warrant, except 
for search-and-rescue operations, the assessment of accidents, fires, floods, 
and storm damage, and other emergency situations, upon approval.135 It 
also explicitly prohibits law enforcement use of weaponized UAVs.136 
Unlike other states, Maine’s UAV statute addresses First Amendment rights 
by prohibiting law enforcement’s use of UAVs to “conduct surveillance of 
private citizens peacefully exercising their constitutional rights of free 
speech and assembly.”137 
Like Maine, Nevada requires a warrant for UAV use by law 
enforcement, but it goes a step further by requiring that warrants specify the 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2013, S. 1016, 113th 
Cong. § 3 (2013). 
 130. Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 1229, 114th Cong. § 3 
(2015). 
 131. State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 2015 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www. ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-
unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-2015-legislation.aspx. 
 132. State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 2016 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (May 23, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-unmanned-
aircraft-systems-uas-2016-legislation.aspx. 
 133. Id. 
 134. State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 2015 Legislation, supra note 131. 
 135. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 4501(4)(B)-(D) (2015). 
 136. Id. § 4501(4)(E). 
 137. Id. § 4501(4)(F). 
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duration of the UAV surveillance and by limiting the duration of use to a 
maximum of ten days.138 Similarly, North Dakota requires that a warrant 
for the use of a UAV include a data collection statement that specifies 
where the UAV will be used, the maximum duration of operation, and the 
type of data being collected.139  
Utah allows the government to use UAVs only when pursuant to a 
warrant or for the purpose of locating a lost or missing individual.140 
Virginia requires a warrant for law enforcement use of UAVs, but also 
provides for warrantless use of UAVs for purposes that “support the 
Commonwealth,” including flood, wildfire, traffic, and general damage 
assessment.141 Florida requires that law enforcement obtain a warrant for 
UAV use, except “to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to 
property, to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or the destruction of 
evidence, or to achieve purposes including, but not limited to, facilitating 
the search of a missing person.”142  
B. State Statutes Regarding Nongovernmental UAV Privacy Invasions  
Some states have enacted legislation or passed amendments aimed at 
nongovernmental UAV operators. These statutes seek to protect individuals 
from privacy invasions. Arkansas, for instance, amended its statute 
regarding video voyeurism to include a section specifically addressing 
UAVs.143 It prohibits individuals from using UAVs for the purpose of 
surreptitiously viewing areas of a person’s body generally covered by 
clothing.144 Mississippi included UAVs in an amendment to its Peeping 
Tom statute, making the use of UAVs for Peeping Tom activities a 
felony.145  
California enacted UAV legislation in response to UAV use by the 
paparazzi.146 This statute first incorporates the concept of physical trespass 
into invasion of privacy, providing that trespass into airspace for the 
purpose of capturing images constitutes physical invasion of privacy.147 
Second, the statute creates liability for constructive invasion of privacy, 
                                                                                                                 
 138. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.112(2) (West 2016). 
 139. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-29.4-03 (West 2015). 
 140. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-18-103 (West 2015). 
 141. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (2015). 
 142. FLA. STAT. § 934.50(4)(c) (2016).  
 143. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-101(b) (West 2015). 
 144. Id. 
 145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61(1)(b) (West 2015). 
 146. State Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 2015 Legislation, supra note 131. 
 147. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1708.8(a) (Deering 2016). 
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thereby creating an interesting solution to one of the shortfalls of trespass as 
an avenue of UAV liability. The provision reads: 
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the 
person attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a 
reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or 
other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, 
personal, or familial activity, through the use of any device, 
regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this image, 
sound recording, or other physical impression could not have 
been achieved without a trespass unless the device was used.148 
This section recognizes situations in which a UAV operator hovers a UAV 
just outside a property owner’s airspace, thus avoiding trespass, but is 
nonetheless able to record the same detail in images as though he or she 
were on the property due to zooming capabilities and vertical vantage 
points. While creative, this statute is unique in its breadth and reflects 
California’s unique concerns related to paparazzi. Also, the law’s 
restrictions on photojournalists may raise First Amendment concerns.  
Finally, Texas goes further than many states by criminalizing the use of 
UAVs to capture images of private property or to capture images with the 
intent to conduct surveillance of individuals, whether or not they are in a 
public place or lack a reasonable expectation of privacy.149 This broad 
prohibition, however, is subject to some nineteen exceptions.150  
C. State Statutes Regarding UAV Applications in Agriculture and Oil and 
Gas 
One of the exceptions listed in Texas’s UAV statute is the use of UAVs 
“by the owner or operator of an oil, gas, water, or other pipeline for the 
purpose of inspecting, maintaining, or repairing pipelines or other related 
facilities.”151 The images, however, must be captured without the intent to 
conduct surveillance on an individual or real property.152 Texas also 
provides a more general exception providing for all UAV use related to rig 
protection and oil pipeline safety.153 At the same time, Texas prohibits 
individuals from operating UAVs over or near critical infrastructure 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. § 1708.8(b). 
 149. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003(a) (West Supp. 2016). 
 150. Id. § 423.005(1). 
 151. Id. § 423.002(a)(17). 
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facilities, which includes oil and gas operations.154 These restrictions apply 
to all individuals other than the owners, the operators, and the 
government.155  
Louisiana has enacted a statute that regulates UAV use in agricultural 
commercial operations.156 Private landowners may use UAVs for 
agricultural commercial operations so long as data collected from the UAV 
is used solely for that purpose or in conjunction with a Louisiana 
postsecondary educational institution.157  
D. Oklahoma’s Proposed Bills and Enacted Legislation 
Oklahoma has introduced several UAV bills but has enacted only one. 
Three UAV bills were introduced during the First Session of the 55th 
Legislature (2015), but all three died in committee. The Oklahoma 
Unmanned Aerial Surveillance Act, which falls in line with other states’ 
legislation requiring a warrant for law enforcement UAV use, sought to 
make it “unlawful for an agent of the state or any political subdivision of 
the state to operate an unmanned aerial vehicle or to disclose or receive 
information acquired through the operation of an unmanned aerial 
vehicle.”158 The proposed Act included exceptions for consent, emergency 
situations (not exceeding forty-eight hours without a warrant), and warrants 
and court orders.159 The Act also would have provided an exception 
allowing for officer use of UAVs on public land, “provided, that the 
surveillance [would] not be targeted at gathering or producing information 
concerning any private individuals or organizations that are using or present 
on the land or property.”160  
Like the Oklahoma Unmanned Aerial Surveillance Act, an Oklahoma 
Senate bill titled “Aircraft; restricting the use of drones” sought to place 
limitations on law enforcement by prohibiting their use of UAVs without a 
warrant.161 While both of the above-referenced bills addressed Fourth 
Amendment concerns by prohibiting warrantless use of UAVs by law 
enforcement, the latter would have also placed limitations on 
nongovernment individuals: “Whoever uses a drone to photograph, record, 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Id. § 423.0045. 
 155. Id. 
 156. LA. STAT. ANN. § 3:44 (2015). 
 157. Id. § 3:44(B)(3). 
 158. H.B. 1295, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015).  
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or otherwise observe another individual in a place where the individual has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy is guilty of a misdemeanor.”162 This 
provision aimed to protect against infringements upon reasonable 
expectations of privacy by nongovernment UAV operators.  
The third UAV bill introduced in 2015 went as far as allowing 
individuals to destroy UAVs that fly over their property without incurring 
civil liability for the damage.163 As UAVs have become more common, 
there have been several instances of individuals employing this proposed 
self-help remedy, with mixed reception. In July 2015, a Kentucky man was 
arrested for shooting down a civilian drone with a shotgun after his two 
daughters told him it was hovering over their property.164 He faced felony 
charges of wanton endangerment and criminal mischief.165 The prior 
September, a similar instance occurred in New Jersey.166 One small 
Colorado town proposed allowing their residents to obtain “hunting” 
licenses for drones, though the town, Deer Trail, eventually rejected the 
proposal.167 The proposal received a harsh response from the FAA, which 
included a reminder that it regulates the nation’s airspace. The FAA 
warned, “Shooting at an unmanned aircraft could result in criminal or civil 
liability, just as would firing at a manned airplane.”168  
Oklahoma is the only state thus far to propose a bill that would allow 
property owners to shoot down drones. The bill was approved by a Senate 
committee in February 2015 and advanced to the full Senate.169 It did not 
receive further consideration, however, during the Second Session of the 
55th Legislature (2016). The bill, though not enacted, illustrates the 
significance Oklahoma places on the privacy rights of property owners. 
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 163. S.B. 492, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015).  
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merideth-kentucky-man-arrested-shooting-n452281. 
 165. Chappel, supra note 164. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Barbee, supra note 7, at 477; see also Colorado Town Shoots Down Drone-Hunting 
Season, NBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ 
colorado-town-shoots-down-drone-hunting-season-n69721 [hereinafter Colorado Town]. 
 168. Colorado Town, supra note 167. 
 169. Bill Chappel, ‘Drone Shoot-Down Bill’ Advances in Oklahoma, NPR (Feb. 10, 
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Titled “Torts: providing civil immunity for damage or destruction of a 
drone on personal property,” the bill reads as follows:  
 B. Any person owning or controlling real estate or other 
premises who voluntarily damages or destroys a drone located 
on the real estate or premises or within the airspace of the 
premises not otherwise regulated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, shall, together with any successors in interest, if 
any, not be civilly liable for causing the damage or destruction to 
the property of such person.170 
Given the FAA’s comments regarding the Deer Trail proposal, 
Oklahoma may have been met with some resistance from the FAA had the 
bill been enacted. Even if an individual shoots at a drone flying below 
FAA-regulated airspace (typically 400 feet above the ground), shooting into 
the air implicates air safety concerns, so the FAA could get involved.171  
The bill had other clear drawbacks. It likely would have led to the 
destruction of UAVs in cases in which the owner was unaware the device 
was flying over private property. Further, property owners might have 
misinterpreted the measure as providing immunity for the discharge of their 
weapon where such discharge would otherwise be prohibited, such as over 
private property in an urban area.172  
During the Second Session of the 55th Legislature (2016), five additional 
UAV bills were introduced, four of which died in committee. House Bill 
2368 sought to prohibit operation of UAVs over private agricultural 
property.173 House Bill 2591 sought to require the owner’s contact 
information to be affixed to their UAV.174 House Bill 3001 sought to create 
the Oklahoma Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Act, which would have 
mandated compliance with FAA rules, prohibited warrantless use of UAVs 
by law enforcement, and authorized UAV use by media, among other 
things.175 House Bill 2337 sought to create the Oklahoma Unmanned Aerial 
Surveillance Act, which would have barred law enforcement from using 
UAVs except pursuant to valid warrants or court orders, individual consent, 
                                                                                                                 
 170. S.B. 492, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015). 
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Drones, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/10/03/self-defense-against-overflying-drones/. 
 173. H.B. 2368, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2016). 
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or during an emergency situation.176 It also would have prohibited 
equipping UAVs with weapons.177 Violations had severe repercussions, 
including fines of up to $2500 and jail time of up to six months.178  
While the above-referenced bills all died in committee, Oklahoma did 
pass one piece of UAV legislation: House Bill 2599, now codified in title 3, 
section 322 of the Oklahoma Statutes. This statute imposes civil liability for 
the operation of a UAV less than 400 feet over a critical infrastructure 
facility or within a distance whereby the UAV interferes with the operations 
or causes a disturbance to the facility.179 Exceptions include the owners and 
operators of the critical infrastructure facility or their agents, law 
enforcement agencies, and the government.180 The statute defines critical 
infrastructure facilities primarily in terms of oil and gas sites, though the 
term also includes facilities such as electrical power generating facilities 
and cell towers.181 
VI. Suggestions for Oklahoma UAV Regulations 
While Oklahoma has passed one piece of UAV legislation, the statute 
does not address issues of UAV use by law enforcement or issues of 
individual privacy. As Oklahoma develops its legislative response to these 
issues, other states’ UAV statutes serve as useful models. With regard to 
restrictions on law enforcement, all states that have enacted such statutes 
have imposed a warrant requirement. Oklahoma should do so as well. The 
United States Congress has likewise illustrated its concern over this issue 
by introducing legislation mandating warrants for UAV use.182 While the 
constitutionality of warrantless UAV searches by law enforcement remains 
an open question,183 the warrant restriction draws a clear line that protects 
the privacy of individuals against government abuse of this new 
technology.  
Further, Oklahoma should consider following the example of Nevada 
and North Dakota in requiring a limit to the duration of UAV use granted 
by warrants. Given the nature of the technology, the duration of UAV 
surveillance would appear to be a factor in determining reasonability under 
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 177. Id. 
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Katz. It makes sense then to impose duration limits on the general warrant 
exception. In addition, Oklahoma should also consider an explicit ban on 
the weaponization of UAVs by law enforcement as several states have 
already done.184 Further, violations should result in the inadmissibility of 
any evidence collected as a result of the violation.  
With regard to restrictions on nongovernmental use, the easiest solution 
to protecting against UAV privacy invasions appears to be amending 
existing applicable statutes. While Texas’s and California’s statutory 
solutions appear too restrictive, amending, for instance, Oklahoma’s 
Peeping Tom or stalking statutes to incorporate this new technology would 
be simple and effective. Oklahoma could add UAVs to the enumerated 
examples of methods of stalking in the statute’s definitions. Similarly, 
Oklahoma could amend its trespass and nuisance statutes to incorporate 
UAV intrusions. This way the state could incorporate additional privacy 
protections under existing and acceptable frameworks.  
Finally, Oklahoma may be interested in UAV legislation regarding the 
agricultural industry as evidenced by the introduction of House Bill 2368 in 
2016, which sought to prohibit UAVs over private agricultural property.185 
While the wide-sweeping UAV-specific protections of Texas may be 
attractive, Oklahoma already provides additional protections for these 
industries against intrusion under title 21, section 1835.2 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes—Trespass to Private Land Primarily Devoted to Farming, 
Ranching, or Forestry186—and the Oklahoma Private Lands and Public 
Recreation Act, which prohibits recreational trespass.187 These may be 
broad enough to encompass aerial trespass, depending on judicial 
interpretation. Here, too, the legislature could amend existing statutes to 
incorporate UAVs into the definitions. Oklahoma could, for instance, add a 
definition for “entry” to section 1835.2, similar to Arizona’s trespass 
statute, defining it as “the intrusion of any part of any instrument or any 
part of a person’s body inside external boundaries of a structure or unit of 
property.”188 
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UAV technology promises many advantages for Oklahomans and 
Oklahoma’s primary industries. From efficient pipeline inspection to crop 
surveying to weather forecasting, UAVs will undoubtedly have a significant 
and positive impact on the state. With the FAA’s recent finalization of its 
UAV rule, Oklahoma, along with many other states, needs to prepare for 
the proliferation of this new technology. The state should not only pass 
legislation that prohibits warrantless UAV surveillance by law enforcement 
but should also take steps to address the privacy concerns implicit in the 
unique capabilities of UAVs to capture audio, still images, and video from 
above while allowing their owners to maintain relative anonymity. 
Oklahoma statutes and common law theories of trespass, private nuisance, 
and invasion of privacy all leave significant gaps through which UAVs 
might easily pass. The Oklahoma legislature should consider closing those 
gaps with simple amendments or by addressing these privacy concerns in a 
larger, UAV-specific statute. Regardless of the method, the state should 
seek to balance the benefits of commercial use, the rights of UAV 
hobbyists, and the privacy concerns of the public. 
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